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RESPONSE
THE ETHICAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF A LAWYER-ETMICIST REVISITED:
THE CASE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S
NEUTRAL EXPERT CONSULTANT
Samuel Dash'
N her recent Fordham Law Review article, Nancy Moore concluded
that my role as contractual expert consultant to Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr was that of an attorney to his client.' Or if
my role were not that of an attorney to a client, then some other
relationship existed between us that imposed similar fiduciary duties
upon me.2 Moore focused on the ethical propriety of the public
release of my resignation letter to Starr on November 20, 1998, in
which I criticized Starr for improperly serving as an aggressive
advocate for impeachment of the President before the House
Judiciary Committee. She finds that my public release of this letter
violated the duties of loyalty and confidentiality owed by an attorney
to a client, or, alternatively, by an agent to a principal.3
Neither the relevant facts of my relationship with Starr, nor the law
governing the establishment of an attorney-client relationship, nor any
other law, supports Moore's analysis and conclusion. Certainly, the
issue of defining the role I played in Starr's investigation is an
important one. Furthermore, the issue is especially timely when
lawyers, as experts, are working with other lawyers and law firms in a
variety of roles that may or not be governed by the rules regulating an
attorney-client relationship. Nancy Moore deserves credit for giving
this issue scholarly attention. My disagreement with her goes to the
facts she assumes4 and to my belief that she stretched some of her
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C.; B.S.,
Temple University; J.D., Harvard Law School; former Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate
Watergate Committee; former member of ABA Standing Committee On Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
1. See Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Role and Responsibilities of a Lawyer-
Ethicist: The Case of the Independent Counsel's Independent Counsel, 68 Fordham L
Rev. 771,775-76 (1999).
2. See id. at 804-05.
3. See id. at 787-93.
4. A substantial portion of Moore's footnotes, which support her factual
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legal interpretations to permit conclusions that defy the policy and
logic of the law.'
Getting the facts right is crucial to the determination of whether the
law professor's role as an advisor is that of an attorney to a client or
some other role, such as an independent expert consultant or witness.
That determination is not usually difficult, as it depends on a careful
analysis of the facts in the specific situation and of the law governing
lawyers. Moore agrees that the law of contracts, not the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, governs when an attorney-client relationship
is established.6 The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers by the American Law Institute, which
Moore cites,7 restates the governing law for establishing an attorney-
client relationship.8 The law requires a voluntary agreement 9 between
the would-be client and the attorney, in which the would-be client
requests legal services of a kind ordinarily provided by a lawyer to a
client and the lawyer consents to provide such services.' 0 It is this
assumptions, quote or cite newspaper stories or columnists. Moore recognizes her
vulnerability to error in relying on such sources when she qualifies such reliance by
saying, "[iut is possible, however, that the press accounts are wrong." Id. at 778. It is
more disturbing that Moore repeatedly quotes lay journalists' critical opinions of my
resignation as authoritative, or, at least, as representative assessments of the validity
of my conduct. Other than to show the recklessness of the news coverage at that
time, of what relevance to Moore's article were these references to the uninformed
opinions of journalists? As is well-known, Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr's
investigations produced a whirlwind of negative comments from journalists. For the
most part they were politically motivated, as Moore recognizes. I received as many
plaudits from the press as I did condemnations. Prior to my resignation, the press
quoted attacks on me by liberal Democratic supporters of the Clinton
Administration. After my resignation, these same critics praised me as a hero, and
my former conservative Republican supporters condemned me as a traitor. What can
Moore make of that?
5. See infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
6. See Moore, supra note 1, at 783.
7. See, e.g., id. at 787 n.102 (citing Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
8. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 26 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). This section of the Restatement, entitled "Formation of Client-
Lawyer Relationship," provides:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) A person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to
the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of
consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.
Id.
9. Under some circumstances, a court can imply such an agreement. See id. §
26(1)(b). I discuss this issue later when I challenge Moore's loose application of this
law. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
10. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 26; see also Innes v.
Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 712 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "'[t]he relationship of
[an] attorney-client is a contractual one, either expressed or implied by the conduct of
the parties [and] [t]hus, the existence of the relationship hinges upon the fact of
mutual assent, either explicit or tacit"' (citation omitted)).
THE NEUTRAL EXPERT CONSULTANT
agreement and undertaking by the attorney that creates the attorney-
client relationship with all the attendant fiduciary responsibilities of
the attorney under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Moore refused to credit the factual statement I sent her, at her
request, except to acknowledge, generously, that I sincerely and
honestly believed I had no attorney-client relationship with Starr."
She relied instead on newspaper stories on which she based her
speculations as to the facts of my agreement with Starr and as to the
kind of services I performed under this agreement.
Perhaps, if we put aside this disagreement over the actual facts, and
look, instead, at hypothetical facts, we can bring some objective clarity
to the analysis of my role with Starr:
Hypothetical 1: Law Firm requests Law Professor to give expert
testimony on a professional responsibility issue. Law Professor
reviews the facts and law, concludes that he can give non-partisan,
objective testimony on the issue that would be favorable to
consulting Law Firm's client, and testifies as an expert witness.
Under these facts, I believe that Moore would agree that Law
Professor has no attorney-client relationship with Law Firm or its
client. ABA Formal Opinion 97-407, which Moore cites, states that
the duty of an expert witness to give non-partisan and objective
testimony is inconsistent with an attorney-client relationship, for such
a relationship requires partisan advocacy by an attorney to advance
the client's interests.'2
Hypothetical 2: Same facts as Hypothetical 1 above, only Law
Professor's review of the facts and law leads him to conclude that he
is unable to give non-partisan, objective testimony supporting Law
Firm's client. Therefore, he refuses to testify as an expert witness.
Here, I believe Moore would also agree that Law Professor has no
attorney-client relationship with Law Firm or its client. She correctly
states that the fact that a consulted lawyer expert does not testify does
not change the relationship between the consulted lawyer and the
consulting law firm.13 ABA Formal Opinion 97-407, however, seems
to call for a different conclusion. Superficially read, this opinion
appears to draw a distinction between a testifying expert witness who
does not have an attorney-client relationship and a non-testifying
expert consultant who does. 4
While Moore, at times, appears influenced by this unsupported
distinction, she ultimately, and correctly, does not read this opinion as
11. See Moore, supra note 1, at 773-74 & nn.25-30.
12. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-
407 (1997) [hereinafter Opinion 97-407].
13. See Moore, supra note 1, at 776-77.
14. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 12; see also Moore, supra note 1, at 776
(quoting from Opinion 97-407).
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establishing two exclusive categories of experts-expert witness and
expert consultant.15 Instead, she reads it as distinguishing between
expert consultants on the question of whether an attorney-client
relationship is formed. 6 As Moore explains, Opinion 97-407 imposes
an attorney-client relationship only where the role of the expert
consultant involves the "'protection of client confidences, in-depth
strategic and tactical involvement in shaping the issues, assistance in
developing facts that are favorable, and zealous partisan advocacy.""17
Therefore, according to Moore's reading of Opinion 97-407, the role
of a lawyer expert consultant is no different than that of an expert
witness: the consulting lawyer does not retain the consultant to
advocate for the client's cause, but instead only for the lawyer
consultant's expert, neutral opinion.
Hypothetical 3: Law Firm consults Law Professor for an expert
opinion on whether certain conduct of a Law Firm lawyer was in
compliance with, or in violation of, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Law Professor provides his expert opinion. The
consultation may or may not have been in anticipation of litigation.
Under these facts, I would read Moore's article to define the role of
this expert consultant as no different from that of the expert witness: a
role that requires no attorney-client relationship. Typically, law firms
that consult expert consultants have not decided whether they will
present expert testimony and only seek the objective, neutral expert
opinion of the consultant to assist them in making that decision.
Here, again, the role of the expert consultant is a neutral and
objective one. The consulting law firm does not expect him to provide
partisan advocacy. This position is supported by ABA Formal
Opinion 98-411, which treats this form of consultation as not involving
an attorney-client relationship. 8 Indeed, in this opinion, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
cautions consulting lawyers that, because no attorney-client
relationship exists, they should be careful not to disclose confidential
client information to the consultant. 9 The Committee advises
consulting lawyers that it is preferable to use hypothetical situations."
Alternatively, the Committee suggests that the consulting lawyer
obtain a specific agreement from the consultant to honor the
confidentiality of information received.2 ' Even under such an
agreement, however, if Law Firm wants to present Law Professor's
15. See Moore, supra note 1, at 776-78.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 777 (quoting from Opinion 97-407) (emphasis added).
18. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-
411 (1998) [hereinafter Opinion 98-4111.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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expert testimony, the court will require Law Professor, in discovery, to
disclose all information received by Law Firm on which Law Professor
relied in forming the expert opinion. 2 It follows, therefore, that if
Law Professor chooses to honor his agreement of confidentiality, the
court will not permit him to testify as an expert witness.
Hypothetical 4: Law Firm and Law Professor agree to a continuing
relationship, whereby on the basis of an hourly fee, Law Professor
will be available to Law Firm to provide neutral, objective, expert
opinions on ethics issues that may arise in the Law Firm.
Additionally, Law Professor will testify as an expert witness in cases
where Law Professor determines he can give non-partisan, objective
testimony in support of Law Firm's position.
Here is where Moore waivers. Apparently, she is willing to find
that there is no attorney-client relationship when the consultation by
the law firm with the law professor is informal, brief, and, preferably,
without payment of a fee to the law professor.' However, she
suggests that a different result may arise, one that may impose
attorney-client obligations, when the relationship between the
consulting law firm and the consulted law professor is continuous and
the law professor provides to the law firm neutral, objective expert
opinions on ethics issues for a substantial hourly fee. 4
Such a distinction is meaningless and unsupported by existing law.
Of what relevance is it to the establishment of an attorney-client
relationship that the consulting law firm continually, over a period of
time, requests its expert consultant to provide neutral, objective
expert opinions? Also, how is the receipt by the expert consultant of
a substantial hourly fee relevant? Moore does not answer these
questions.
She may assume that if an expert consultant has a continuing
relationship with a consulting law firm and receives a substantial fee,
these factors jeopardize the neutrality and objectivity of the expert
consultant and may induce him to behave as more of a partisan
advocate than a neutral expert. Nothing in the law governing lawyers,
however, even suggests such a distinction or concern. To the contrary,
Rule 3.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a rule
concerned with inducements for false testimony, permits the payment
of a reasonable fee to the expert for his research and testimony. 5
Furthermore, the rule does not restrict the number of times the same
law firm may engage the expert witness or expert consultant. 6 The
22. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 12.
23. See Moore, supra note 1, at 781.
24. See id. at 782-83.
25. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 3 (1998).
26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-
354 (1987) [hereinafter Opinion 87-354]. In this opinion, the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility approved a lawyer's use of
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rule does prohibit a contingent fee, payment of which depends on the
outcome of the litigation, because such a fee gives the expert a stake
in the outcome, and might induce him to testify falsely to earn a
higher fee. 7
Moore even cites the law holding that the payment of a fee is
irrelevant to the establishment of an attorney-client relationship. 8
She also acknowledges that many law professors receive
compensation by serving as independent expert consultants to law
firms without creating an attorney-client relationship with the
consulting law firm or its client.2 9 Further, I think Moore would agree
that the establishment of an attorney-client relationship does not
depend on how frequently a law firm requests services from an expert
consultant. Indeed, she explains that the request for services, by itself,
does not create an attorney-client relationship." Instead, she stresses
that the kind of services the law firm requests and the expert
consultant performs will determine whether the consultant has
undertaken attorney-client obligations.3
She illustrates this point with an example of when an expert
consultant may have entered into an attorney-client relationship. She
explains that if the law firm requests that the law professor, as expert
consultant, write an appellate brief or make an oral argument in court
for the client, an attorney-client relationship is established. Moore is
right that such a partisan advocate role necessitates the imposition of
attorney-client fiduciary obligations. Alternatively, when the services
that the law firm requests of the law professor, whether requested
once or over an extended period of time, require the provision of
neutral, objective expert opinions, then the expert consultant's role
does not differ from that of an expert witness. Thus no attorney-client
relationship will be assumed or established.
Therefore, the crucial question in determining the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship between a consulting law firm and an
expert witnesses supplied by a company with which the expert had a continuing
relationship. See id. The Standing Committee cautioned, however, that the expert's
compensation should be separate and apart from the company's charge of a
contingent fee for its referral services. See id.
27. See id.; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 3.
28. See Moore, supra note 1, at 781 nn.70-71 and accompanying text. For this
reason, it is difficult to understand why Moore appears so obsessed with my fee. She
repeatedly refers to my hourly rate in contexts suggesting that she believes that such a
"substantial" fee is incompatible with the required neutrality and objectivity of an
expert witness. See id. at 775, 782-83. Not only is my fee irrelevant to whether Starr
and I established an attorney-client relationship, the fee is well within the range of
fees charged by law professors as expert witnesses or expert consultants. Indeed, in
recent times, my fee has fallen behind a number of my contemporary law professor
ethicists.
29. See id. at 783-86.
30. See id. at 783.
31. See id. at 783-84.
32. See id.
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expert consultant is: What specific services does the law firm request
and the expert consultant agree to perform? Opinion 97-407 deals
with this question, and explains that where the services requested of
the expert consultant are characteristic of partisan advocacy for the
interests of the client, the law professor is performing a role that is
typical of an attorney-client relationship.33
For example, a law firm may consult a law professor, who is an
expert in a field of law, to help prepare pleadings in a lawsuit
involving that field of law, or to assist in the cross-examination of an
expert witness in an upcoming trial. In undertaking to perform such
services, the law professor becomes co-counsel with the law firm in
representing the client. But where the facts show that the law firm
and the law professor have simply agreed to the provision of a neutral,
objective expert opinion, whether for the purpose of giving expert
testimony or otherwise, no attorney-client relationship has been
established under the governing law.
Where does my relationship with Starr fit into this analysis? The
answer depends on the facts concerning the specific services Starr
requested of me, as an expert consultant, and that I agreed to, and did,
perform. Moore's conclusions on this question are unsound because
they are based on factual speculations that are unrelated to and
unsupported by my actual role with Starr. Because of this factual
inaccuracy in Moore's article, leading to a confusing application of the
relevant law, I believe I must restate the facts of my relationship with
Starr.
Shortly after Starr was appointed Independent Counsel,
Democratic leaders attacked him as a partisan Republican who was
incapable of being independent and of conducting an objective
investigation of President Clinton. Starr accepted the appointment
with the conviction that he would conduct a professional and objective
investigation. His excellent reputation for integrity in his former
positions as federal circuit court of appeals judge and Solicitor
General of the United States supported his assessment. Starr was
concerned, however, that the appearance of political bias created by
these attacks against him could seriously erode public confidence in
his conduct as Independent Counsel.
It was this concern that led Starr to invite me to serve him and his
staff as an independent, neutral, and objective expert consultant on
legal ethics and on issues arising from the prosecution function of his
office. In defining my role at the outset, Starr and I agreed that I
would remain strictly apart from the investigative and prosecutorial
functions of the Independent Counsel, and that I would not undertake
any operational duties or tasks in furtherance of his mandate. Thus, I
would not conduct investigations, question witnesses, present
33. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 12.
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testimony or arguments in court, write briefs or memos advocating or
supporting investigative and prosecutorial positions, or provide any
other services that would, or would appear to, involve me as an
advocate for Starr or his position as Independent Counsel.'
In effect, Starr installed me as an advisory, neutral "ombudsman" to
review his staff's and his own ethical conduct in his investigations and
prosecutions.35 Not only did I insist upon this independent, non-
partisan role, but Starr also considered it necessary. He believed my
oversight would support his goal of assuring the public of his fairness
and non-political decision-making. Although Starr is a highly
experienced and sophisticated lawyer and did not require a disclaimer,
I expressly informed Starr that I did not represent him or his staff and
did not have an attorney-client relationship with them.
I submit that the facts I have stated above concerning my
relationship with Starr negate the establishment of an attorney-client
relationship.36 Rather, these facts would require a court to hold me to
the same obligations of an expert witness, and no more. Also, I
assume from Moore's article that on these specific facts she might
agree. 37 However, Moore's article was not based on these specific
facts. She assumed a different set of facts.38
34. I did not have an office in Starr's suite of offices. I visited Starr's office from
time to time when Starr requested my expert opinion on an ethical or prosecutorial
issue. In keeping with my limited role as an expert consultant, most of the ongoing
work of the Independent Counsel and his staff proceeded outside of my presence or
without my knowledge. Often, the first I would hear of Starr's investigative or
prosecutorial conduct was upon reading newspaper reports indicating that someone
had criticized or challenged such conduct.
35. I do not mean by this that I was a passive recipient of information upon which
I expressed sterile opinions. Because of the on-going nature of my role as an expert,
neutral consultant, I believed it to be important for my continued credible service that
my opinions be followed by Starr and his staff. In most cases, I was informed about
relevant facts and issues while I attended meetings held by Starr with his staff. Staff
lawyers around the table will remember that I expressed my opinions aggressively.
Although I was not a partisan advocate for Starr's investigations or prosecutions, I
believed that my role as an "ombudsman" required that my opinions be presented
and defended persuasively so as to effectively influence the decisions Starr and his
staff would make on the proposed conduct or procedure at issue.
36. Moore seems to believe that even if I did not have an attorney-client
relationship with Starr, the service I performed at a "substantial fee" had to make me
accountable to someone in some respect. Moore, supra note 1, at 783. Of course, I
was accountable to Starr under contract law for competence, care, and diligence in
performing my service.
37. On the other hand, Moore indicates that even on these specific facts she might
find an attorney-client relationship because, as she says, I gave Starr expert opinions
on prospective actions. See id. at 784-85 & nn.91, 93. She explains that lawyers
typically advise clients on the lawfulness of prospective conduct. See id. at 784-85.
This is a false analogy. The expression by a lawyer of an opinion as to proposed
future conduct is not a function unique to an attorney-client relationship. Consulting
lawyers may often request lawyer-ethicists, as expert consultants, to opine on a
proposed course of conduct and, later, to be ready to testify as an expert witness on
the propriety of that conduct.
38. Moore was in touch with me during the writing of her article. As I stated
1072 [Vol. 68
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A clear example of her factual inaccuracy is her conclusion from
news reports that I wrote part of Starr's impeachment referral report
to the House Judiciary Committee and therefore played the role of a
partisan advocate, rather than that of a neutral expert.-9 The fact is
that I wrote no part of this report. Consistent with my role as a
neutral expert, I reviewed the report to give Starr my neutral, expert
opinion on issues of ethical and legal propriety.
Also, Moore seized upon the statement in my letter to her that I
"facilitated Monica Lewinsky's willingness to testify before the grand
jury."' Moore wonders what I meant by the word "facilitated,"
speculating that I actively negotiated with Lewinsky's lawyers for her
testimony as a partisan advocate for Starr."
If Moore had asked me, I would have told her that I played no
partisan role in this negotiation. Both Starr and Lewinsky's lawyers
knew my role was that of a neutral, expert consultant and trusted me
to serve as an objective observer. The only way I facilitated this
negotiation was through my role as a neutral, expert consultant.
Because both sides trusted me, I influenced their willingness to get
together. Additionally, I offered the privacy of my home for the
meeting, away from the surveillance of news reporters.
I played a similar role in the initial questioning of Monica Lewinsky
in New York by Starr's staff. Her lawyers had insisted that I be
present as an objective observer of the fairness of the interrogation.4
I neither asked questions nor suggested any to the independent
counsel staff, at that time or at any other, including when Lewinsky
was questioned later in Starr's office and when she testified before the
grand jury.
Although my role as independent, expert consultant to Starr and his
office was unique and unprecedented under the independent counsel
legislation, it was equivalent to my usual role as expert consultant or
witness on legal ethical issues for lawyers and law firms. In such cases,
I do not represent the client or the lawyer, but serve as an expert
resource on issues permitting expert testimony. As in the case with
Starr, I have no duty to advocate a favorable position for the clients of
the lawyers who consult me. My opinion must be as neutral and non-
partisan as is required when I testify as an expert witness. In those
above, she requested my explanation of my role with Starr, which I sent to her. If she
had doubts concerning any of the details of that role, she could have asked me
directly, instead of speculating on those details. She never asked me.
39. See Moore, supra note 1, at 778 n.51, 803 n.189.
40. Id. at 778 n.52.
41. See id. at 778-79.
42. There were other occasions when counsel for a witness, subject, or target
requested my presence as an objective observer at a meeting with Starr or some of his
staff. These lawyers knew of my role as a neutral, objective expert and trusted that
my presence would lead to a more reasonable and fair resolution of the issues under
discussion.
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cases where my opinion does not support the consulting lawyer's
desired position, the lawyer either abandons that position or does not
call me as an expert witness.
A particularly troubling part of Moore's article is her loose and
flawed application, to my role with Starr, of the law permitting a court
to imply an attorney-client relationship in the absence of an express
agreement.43 In some cases, where there has not been an express
agreement, courts will imply such an agreement, sometimes under the
principle of promissory estoppel. For example, courts will imply an
agreement where the attorney should have been aware, under the
circumstances, that the individual requesting representation believed
an attorney-client relationship had been established and relied on
such a belief." Alternatively, courts will not imply an agreement if the
lawyer promptly explains to the individual that there is no attorney-
client relationship between them, and that any information the
individual discloses to the lawyer will not be protected as confidential
or under the attorney-client privilege.45
As is obvious from this example, the policy behind implying
attorney-client agreements is the protection of the layperson's legal
rights, as well as the information a layperson may mistakenly disclose
to a lawyer in the reasonable belief the lawyer is representing him.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct address this kind of
ambiguous situation in Rules 4.3 and 1.13(d).46 Rule 1.13(d) governs
the responsibilities of a lawyer who represents an organization such as
a corporation.47 It requires the lawyer for an organization, when
dealing with an employee or constituent of the organization, to
explain that his client is the organization, not the employee or
constituent, in situations where it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to the employee or constituent.48
Similarly, Rule 4.3, which concerns a lawyer's dealings with an
unrepresented person, imposes on the lawyer the duty not to state or
imply that the lawyer is disinterested.49 Also, Rule 4.3 requires that
where the lawyer "knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding."5"
As should be clear from this discussion, there are a number of
reasons why the policies behind implying attorney-client agreements
43. See id. at 780-81.
44. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 26(1)(b) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
45. See id.
46. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.13(d), 4.3 (1998).
47. See id. Rule 1.13(d).
48. See id.
49. See id. Rule 4.3.
50. Id.
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are inapt concerning my role with Starr. First, my agreement with
Starr involved two lawyers with extensive experience in legal
relationships, and did not require the auxiliary protection provided to
an uninformed layperson in dealing with a lawyer. Further, at the
very beginning of our discussions of my role, I specifically informed
Starr, consistent with Rules 1.13(d) and 4.3, and the principles of
promissory estoppel, that I did not have an attorney-client
relationship with him or his staff. I also indicated that I would not
undertake any duties or responsibilities inherent in an attorney-client
relationship. Under these circumstances, and the underlying facts, an
attorney-client relationship could not be implied or presumed. 5'
Moore summarily dismisses the specific disclaimers that Starr and I
made about an attorney-client relationship as mere labeling.' She
argues that the fiduciary responsibilities of a lawyer cannot be avoided
by simply denying an attorney-client relationship that, in fact and in
law, exists.53 Of course, that is correct. But Moore misunderstands
the point. This is not a case of denying a relationship that clearly
exists. Instead, this is a case where the expert consultant and the
consulting lawyer expressly refused to establish an attorney-client
relationship at the outset, and subsequently conducted themselves
consistently with this refusal. It is precisely because I refused to, and
did not, perform attorney-client services for Starr or his staff that no
attorney-client relationship was ever established, or could be
implied.'
Moore writes that it does not matter whether I had an attorney-
client relationship with Starr.5 5 She argues that "other law" imposed
on me the same fiduciary obligations required by that relationship. 6
51. See First Nat'l Bank v. Trans Terra Corp., 142 F.3d 802, 807 (5th Cir. 1998)
("An attorney-client relationship can arise by express agreement or by implication
from the parties' actions [and furthermore] courts will not readily find an implied
relationship 'absent a sufficient showing of intent."' (citations omitted)).
52. See Moore, supra note 1, at 778.
53. See id. at 778-81.
54. Moore refers to Hill ex reL Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990), to show analogous principles for establishing a physician-patient
relationship. See Moore, supra note 1, at 781 n.73. By analogy, the holding in Hill
negates the establishment of an attorney-client relationship between Starr and me. In
finding no physician-patient relationship, the Court specifically stated:
Defendant here was dealing with medical doctors who were not under his
direction or control. He was entitled to assume that these doctors were
cognizant of the circumstances under which the various cases were discussed,
i.e., without defendant having personally examined the patient, and would
themselves in dealing directly with their patients rely on their own ultimate
opinions following proper medical procedures. Imposition of liability tnder
these circumstances would not be prophylactic but instead counter-productive
by stifling efforts at improving medical knowledge.
Hill, 463 N.W.2d at 268 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55. See Moore, supra note 1, at 775-76.
56. See id. at 789-90 & nn.110-14.
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She points to the principal-agent relationship under agency law as
attaching fiduciary obligations of loyalty and confidentiality to my role
as neutral, expert consultant to Starr.57 Her argument, however, is
circuitous. It is this same law of agency that defines when an attorney-
client relationship is established.
If there is no attorney-client relationship between the expert
consultant and the consulting lawyer or his client under the facts and
the law of agency, it also follows that under the law of agency the
expert consultant is not an agent owing fiduciary obligations to a
principal. This is precisely true here, because Starr did not control or
supervise my work, as a principal does with an agent, and I had no
obligation to pursue, as a partisan, the interests of Starr and his staff.
Moore cannot change this result by manipulating agency law to lift
herself up by her own boot straps, as the legal saying goes.
Furthermore, Moore argues that even when no attorney-client
relationship exists, such a relationship may develop when the expert
consultant receives confidential or strategy information from the
consulting lawyer. 9  What remarkable magic produces this
transformation? Moore relies on the dictum in Opinion 97-407 for her
argument. ° However, a later opinion of the ABA Standing
Committee specifically refutes this untenable position and concludes
that no attorney-client relationship is established when a lawyer
consults an expert consultant for a neutral, expert opinion.61
Moreover, Opinion 98-411 states that the receipt by the expert
consultant of otherwise confidential information does not prevent him
from disclosing that information.62 The Opinion justified its stance by
stating that the expert consultant does not act as lawyer for the client
and therefore may have no duty of confidentiality regarding the
communications he receives from the consulting lawyer or law firm.63
57. See id. at 790-93.
58. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 26 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins.
Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Under Kansas law, the relation between
an attorney and his client has been held to be one of agency to which the general rules
of agency apply."); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 1998) ("The
attorney-client relationship between Diane Walsh and the estate... invoked
principles of agency law...."); Peter Margulies et al., Report of Working Group on
Client Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1003, 1011 (1994) ("[Tjhe working group
repeatedly examined the basis of a lawyer's authority to act [and] [algency law is
clearly the primary foundation of the attorney-client relationship."); John P. Gillard,
Jr., Comment, Pay-Per-Call Legal Advice, Professional Integrity, and Legal Licenses:
Why 1-900-Lawyers is a Call to the Wrong Number, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 549, 566 (1996)
("Courts have historically used contract law and principles of agency to determine
whether an attorney-client relationship has been established.").
59. See Moore, supra note 1, at 778 & nn.53-54.
60. See id.
61. See Opinion 98-411, supra note 18.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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The courts confirm this position with regard to consultants who are
expert witnesses by requiring the consultant to disclose, in discovery
proceedings, all information he received from the consulting lawyer
on which he relied in formulating his expert opinion.' For this
reason, Opinion 98-411 cautions consulting lawyers to use
hypothetical situations or to obtain a specific agreement from the
expert consultant not to disclose confidential information.
I had no such agreement with Starr. I was, however, subject to the
criminal sanctions of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which prohibits unauthorized disclosure of grand jury
information.6 My role as expert consultant required me to have
access to grand jury information and, for this reason, I took an oath
not to disclose such information.
Moore's reasoning that my role was that of an attorney to a client is
undermined by her inability to identify who the client was, and her
misapplication of legal principles in her speculations as to the client's
identity.67 At different times Moore speculates that my client was
Starr, Starr's staff, the "government agency"-Office of Independent
Counsel-or all three.' She rejects the possibility that the people of
the United States were the client.69
Her fallacy is due, in part, to her misunderstanding of the provisions
and purposes of the independent counsel legislation." This legislation
did not, as Moore seems to believe, create another government
agency known as the Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC").!'
64. See Opinion 97-407, supra note 12.
65. See Opinion 98-411, supra note 18.
66. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
67. See Moore, supra note 1, at 794-804.
68. See id.
69. See id at 796.
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (expired 1999).
71. The only time such an office was created, Congress did not do so; rather it was
created by the attorney general. See In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir.
1987). When the Iran-Contra independent counsel was challenged in court on the
ground that the legislation was unconstitutional, the Attorney General, under his
regulatory powers, created the "Office of Independent Counsel: Iran-Contra." See id.
He created this office inside the Department of Justice and gave a parallel
appointment under this new regulation to the independent counsel appointed by the
court. See id at 56. It is also clear that Congress did not create a new federal agency
called the Office of Independent Counsel. This term refers solely to the appointment
of an appropriate independent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 593 (expired 1999). The
legislation mentions the office of independent counsel only twice-once when dealing
with restrictions on payment of travel expenses for commuting to the "primary office
of the independent counsel," and the second time when authorizing, in the same
section, the appointment of additional personnel for the purpose of carrying out the
duties of "an office of independent counsel." Id. § 594. In these descriptive
references, it is obvious that Congress was either identifying the place where the
independent counsel and his staff worked or was authorizing additional personnel to
help the independent counsel carry out his duties. It is also significant that the
drafters of the legislation used lower-case letters for "independent counsel" and
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Rather, on the application of the attorney general, it authorized a
special division of the court to appoint an individual lawyer, called an
independent counsel, to substitute for the attorney general as chief
federal prosecutor in a limited matter, under certain specified
circumstances.72
The creation of another government agency in the executive branch
to investigate charges of criminal conduct by the President or other
high federal officials would have been incompatible with Congress's
intent. Congress wanted to sever the prosecutorial function from the
chief executive and the attorney general and to transfer it to an
independent, individual lawyer appointed by the special division of
the court.73 This transfer would resolve the obvious conflicts of
interest that might arise if the Department of Justice, or some other
executive agency, had the responsibility to investigate criminal
charges against the President. This becomes clear when one recalls
that the principal trigger for the legislation was the "Saturday Night
Massacre," the event in which President Nixon ordered the firing of
Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox, whom the attorney
general had appointed. Congress passed the legislation to prevent
such a travesty of justice from occurring again.
Thus, contrary to Moore's thesis, there is no "government agency"
of which the independent counsel is the head.74 Under the legislation,
the independent counsel stands alone, as an individual, and acts as a
substitute for the attorney general and the Department of Justice
"office of independent counsel," while they capitalized "Attorney General" and
"Department of Justice." Id. § 591.
72. See id. §§ 591-593.
73. In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Congress's transfer of the federal prosecution function to an
independent counsel appointed by the court under the limited provisions of the
legislation. See id. at 696-97. The Court held that Congress could authorize the court
to appoint the independent counsel because he was an inferior officer. See id. at 695.
Also, there was no violation of the separation of powers because the legislation gave
neither Congress nor the court supervisory powers over the prosecution function of
the independent counsel. See id. at 693-96. Significantly, although the Court stated
that the independent counsel was an executive officer, it consistently referred to the
independent counsel as an individual lawyer and not as a federal executive agency.
See id. passim.
74. In a case wholly unrelated to the issues discussed here, the Merit Systems
Protection Board found that the Office of the Independent Counsel was an "agency"
for purposes of review by the Board under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.
See O'Brien v. Office of Independent Counsel, 74 M.S.P.B. 192, 199 (1997). The
Merit Systems Protection Board's opinion, however, was clearly intended only to
provide a remedy for a temporary employee of an independent counsel, who claimed
he was discharged by the independent counsel for complaining about irregularities in
the independent counsel's office. See id. at 195. The opinion did not intend to
interpret the independent counsel legislation as creating a new federal agency. It is
significant, in this regard, that it was the Merit Systems Protection Board that put the
quotation marks around the word agency. See id. at 199.
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combined.' Therefore, there is no ground for her assumption that,
under Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
deals with the representation of organizations, my client was an
organization called the Office of Independent Counsel."
Indeed, in any given year, there were usually several independent
counsels, each appointed by the court, operating simultaneously.
Each was completely separate and independent from the other; each
had a different mandate. Under Moore's theory, each appointment
created a new government agency called the Office of Independent
Counsel. This is an absurdity.
Additionally, Congress made no appropriations of funds to the
independent counsel, as it would have if the independent counsel
headed up a new government agency. Instead, it assigned the
expenditures of an independent counsel to the budget of the
Department of Justice, even though that department had no
supervisory power or control over the independent counsel.'
In examining Moore's argument that someone or some entity was
my client, it would be helpful to determine whether Starr had a client,
and if so, who that client was. Because the client of the independent
counsel cannot have been a non-existent government agency, who,
then, was the client? Both the purpose and history of the controlling
legislation compel the conclusion that the people of the United States
were the client of the appointed independent counsel. His specific
statutory authority permitted no government agency to supervise or
control him. Congress required the appointment of an independent
counsel by the court to protect the people's interest and assure their
confidence in the effective administration of federal criminal justice.
Furthermore, in the context of the powers and mandate given by the
legislation and the court, the independent counsel's role as the
people's lawyer cannot truly be one of an attorney to his client.79
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (expired 1999) ("[The] independent counsel ... [has]
full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the Attorney General ....");
United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 364 (5th Cir. 1998) ("An Independent
Counsel prosecutes in the name of the United States and enjoys 'full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice."' (citations omitted)).
76. See Moore, supra note 1, at 798-800 & nn.159-69.
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(i) (expired 1999).
7& See id. §§ 591-599; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93. In Morrison, the Supreme
Court recognized that although the independent counsel was an executive official, he
was not under the control of the President or the Attorney General. Ild. The
legislation did, however, give the Attorney General the power to remove the
independent counsel for good cause. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (expired 1999). But
even this power is circumscribed by the legislation, for it gives the independent
counsel a right to judicial review of such a dismissal. See id. § 596(a)(3).
79. This holds true for both federal and state prosecutors, as well. See United
States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (,The
prosecutor... is not simply a lawyer advocating the government's perspective of the
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None of the indicia of such a relationship exist. He receives no
confidential information from "the people."'  He has no duty to
communicate regularly with "the people" about the details of his
work.8" The people certainly cannot control the objectives of his
investigations and prosecutions, as the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct reserve for the client,' and the people cannot, at will,
discharge the independent counsel. 3
While the independent counsel has no duty of client confidentiality,
the United States Attorneys' Manual, which the legislation requires
the independent counsel to follow, constrains him from disclosing
information about ongoing investigations.' Also, Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the independent
counsel from disclosing grand jury information.85
Contrary to what Moore suggests, Starr could not be my client. I
could not represent him in his position as independent counsel
because the court appointed him-and not me-and Starr could not
have delegated to me any of his statutory authority. Also, pursuant to
the independent counsel statute, the independent counsel controls
both the goals and means of the investigations and prosecutions,
which is incompatible with the relationship between an attorney and a
client as defined by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 6
Of course, I could have represented Starr in his personal capacity,
case... [he] is the alter ego of the United States exercising its sovereign power of
prosecution."); People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 156, 170 (Ct.
App. 1978). In Younger, the court held:
However valid these assumptions may be in the case of an attorney or law
firm engaged in practice for remuneration and the normal attorney-client
relationship, they have virtually no validity in the case of the multi-deputy
prosecutorial office of a district attorney. The prosecutorial office of an
elected district attorney and the relationship between the district attorney
and his sole client, the People, are fundamentally and decisively different
from a law firm and the ordinary attorney-client relationship.
Id. See generally Rachel Luna, Note, The Ethics of Kiss-and-Tell Prosecution:
Prosecutors and Post-Trial Publications, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 165 (1988). In this Note,
Luna recognizes that the prosecutor has no attorney-client relationship, and therefore
no duty of confidentiality. See id. at 168. Furthermore, Luna recommends an
amendment to the Prosecution Function Standards of the ABA Standards on
Criminal Justice. See id. at 185-86. Such an amendment would impose a bar on a
prosecutor publishing a tell-all book. See id.
80. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1998) (describing the
importance of confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship).
81. See id. Rule 1.4.
82. See id. Rule 1.2.
83. See id. Rule 1.16 cmt. 4 ("A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time,
with or without cause....").
84. See 1 U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, §§ 1-7.111, 1-
7.530 (2d ed. 1997) (prohibiting release of information about ongoing investigations).
85. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
86. Indeed, Moore suggests that if the consulting lawyer is obligated to make his
own independent decision, an attorney-client relationship may not exist. See Moore,
supra note 1, at 781-82.
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as Moore suggests, when he was being investigated on various
charges, such as the alleged leak of grand jury information. In fact,
Starr asked me to represent him. I declined to do so, however, on the
ground that I did not want to change my status as a neutral expert
consultant. Starr retained another lawyer to represent him in these
investigations.
The independent counsel cannot retain another independent
counsel because this would be precluded by the very terms of the
legislation. Also, as previously discussed, the independent counsel
legislation created no government organization that could have been
my client. Like Starr, I received no confidential client information
from Starr's client, the people of the United States. Furthermore, I
could not control the decisions the independent counsel made under
his mandate, which is antithetical to what the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require a lawyer to do for his client. However,
while I did not have an attorney-client relationship with Starr, I was,
like Starr, still bound not to disclose grand jury information by Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and not to disclose
investigative secrets by the Justice Department guidelines.
I contend that the public release of my resignation letter, which
contained no grand jury information or investigative secrets, was
ethically proper. This is not to say that I believe expert consultants
should, willy-nilly, disclose information they obtain from consulting
lawyers. That would be unprofessional and, of course, bad business.
Other circumstances compelled the public release of my letter.
By using my presence as an "ombudsman" to reassure the public
that his investigations were fair and objective, Starr frequently and
publicly relied on my expert opinions to rebut attacks on his conduct.
He also referred to my opinions when explaining his conduct to judges
and the Department of Justice. Starr urged and authorized me to
explain my opinions to journalists, which I always did on the record.
I was concerned, however, that unless I made a public disclaimer,
Starr's public reliance on my opinions that supported his conduct
could create a perception in the media and in the public that I also
had approved other conduct by Starr, which, in fact, my opinions did
not support. The number of on-going investigations into some of the
alleged conduct of Starr and his staff heightened this concern. 7
87. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine his. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (2d
Cir. 1974), for an analogous exception to the duty of confidentiality even when an
attorney-client relationship exists. In this case, the Second Circuit applied Canon 4 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the self-defense exception. See W.
Meyerhofer involved a lawyer who objected to the submission by his law firm of a
fraudulent registration statement to the SEC. See id. at 1192. The court upheld the
lawyer's right to disclose confidential information to the SEC and to the counsel for
the opposing plaintiffs. See id. at 1195. The opposing plaintiffs had brought a lawsuit
against the lawyer's law firm and the information he gave to them prevented his being
named as a defendant in the lawsuit. See id. at 1193.
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Fortunately, the need for such a public disclaimer did not become
necessary until my resignation.
CONCLUSION
No doubt, Nancy Moore had a difficult assignment to analyze and
define my role with Starr. The independent counsel legislation and
the autonomous authority it gives the independent counsel were
unique. Indeed, the principal criticism of the independent counsel,
with which I disagree, has been that he is not accountable to any
political or government organization. Similarly, the relationship of an
expert consultant to such an autonomous public official has been
unexplored. This is particularly so where the independent counsel
and the expert consultant deliberately carve out a role of neutrality
and independence for the consultant in an effort to negate an
attorney-client relationship.
My disappointment over Moore's article, apart from her factual
inaccuracies, results from her narrow and wooden application of
general principles of law to a new and special situation. This is
unfortunate, because this approach treats the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and governing law as mechanical strictures to be
mechanically applied. I believe that most legal ethicists disagree with
this view. They believe that the goals of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and their predecessor, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, are to define duties and responsibilities
which will assure that lawyers protect their clients' interests and will
preserve the integrity of the legal system.
I believe that the correct application of these rules requires ethicists
to know not only the letter of a rule, but, also, to understand the
underlying reason and purpose of a rule. This permits a
determination of whether conduct that the specific wording of a rule
seems to mechanically cover actually fits the reason and purpose of
the rule. I believe it is safe to say that if it does not, the rule was never
meant to restrain such conduct. After all, lawyers must live with and
by these rules. The success of the rules in regulating the conduct of
lawyers depends on the Bar's acceptance of them and the good faith
belief of lawyers that they will be applied equitably.
It is particularly important that lawyer-ethicists apply and interpret
the law defining attorney-client relationships and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in this goal-oriented context. Such application
and interpretation will encourage lawyers to seek expert help in
making ethical decisions and encourage law professors with such
expertise to willingly provide such help. Moore's effort to arbitrarily
and mechanically impose the fiduciary obligations of an attorney-
client relationship on such consultations can lead only to confusion.
Additionally, it may serve to deter law professors from acting as
expert consultants to lawyers who desire the expert opinions as a
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means of ensuring that their professional conduct is consistent with
ethical standards.
Notes & Observations
